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KEY PROCEDURAL ISSUES: TRANSPARENCY

Comments
PETER CLARK* AND PETER MORRISON**

PETER CLARK: Whitney Debevoise provides an excellent overview of transparency issues in WTO dispute settlement. His paper provides a very useful focus
for the debate on how the Dispute Settlement Understanding might be modified
in this year's review.
While Mr. Debevoise reports that there have been important improvements
in transparency from the pre-WTO procedures, there is much left to be done.
He identified many elements of the process that could benefit from improved
transparency. The WTO's dispute settlement procedures must be open and transparent, and most important, they must be seen to be open, transparent, and fair.
This is a sine qua non if the WTO is to be a credible and effective arbiter of
international trade disputes.
While Mr. Debevoise's paper outlines the issues involved in improving transparency in the WTO, it is of utmost importance that we understand the current
environment that necessitates these changes.
An improved transparency is an increasingly important political issue for governments. It is essential to ensuring procedural fairness and equity for stakeholders, and vital to the credibility of the WTO which is under ever increasing public
scrutiny. The WTO dispute settlement procedures are better than the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's (GATT's), but they must operate in an environment where trade/investment are now discussed as much at kitchen tables as in
the boardroom, environmentalists criticize ineffectiveness of the rules, and labor/
farmers/NGOs criticize the evils of globalization.

*Peter Clark is a former Canadian trade official and negotiator. He was Canadian liaison with
GATT and a member of settlement rosters for CUSTFA, NAFTA and the WTO. He is CEO of
Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates, Limited, International Trade Strategists, Ottawa, Canada.
**Peter Morrison heads the World Trade Group in Clifford Chance, London. From 1989 to 1996
he was with the GATT and WTO Secretariats. Upon leaving the WTO in 1996 he was Senior Legal

Officer.
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Stakeholders must be comfortable that their interests are being judged fairly
and effectively. The secrecy that surrounds tariff negotiations, which were an
element of fiscal policy (tax policy), is neither warranted nor appropriate for the
wider range of issues that may be disputed at the WTO. Critics of the process
are not wrong. Unless they get answers, political support for further liberalization
could be jeopardized.
While WTO transparency is improved over the GATT system, the WTO has
made only the first steps. The increased transparency is responsive to the demands
of participants. This is not automatic. Even with improved internet access to DSM
documents, the available information lags events, when it should be simultaneous.
On the private sector side, issues are being addressed that could have serious
implications for the livelihoods of many stakeholders both large and small. The
agricultural sector is a prime example. Farmers are very reluctant to place their
fates in the hands of their government or disinterested panelists without direct
input or full involvement of their own counsel at every stage of the dispute
settlement process. These domestic interests are at the very heart of such trade
disputes, and at this time, the farmers are neither formally represented nor entitled
to view the proceedings.
Governments ignore NGO and grass roots pressure at their peril. The failure
in Canada and the United States to consult effectively on the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (now in a deep coma) should be ample evidence of
this.' Disclosure must be full and frank, not selective and manipulated.
Environmentalists attack the ineffectiveness of the rules in addition to labor
groups, farmers and NGOs who criticize the evils of globalization as a whole.
Further, this opposition will become more forceful and outspoken as the forces
of economic interdependence and cooperation grow stronger. Even those groups
in favor of strong international organizations like the WTO can point to its procedural restrictiveness and lack of openness. The WTO must operate in a credible
way under the intense scrutiny of increasingly aware and skeptical publics. It
must be fair, and this can only be achieved by fully open procedures and access.
Only then will the critics be disarmed.
Environmentalists are displeased with the toothless nature of the rules as applied
to their interests. Excluding them from the process simply creates another grievance, and it is a grievance that politicians are hard-pressed to dismiss by invoking
tradition or secrecy. Traditions change, and in most WTO disputes, secrecy is
seriously overplayed. Confidentiality is seldom an issue in dispute settlement
panels, and where it is, the confidential and proprietary information can be protected with relative ease. Panelists deal with principles and interpretations of
rules; they seldom review balance sheets, income statements, proprietary information, or trade secrets.
1. OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Negotiating Text (as of April 24, 1998)
(visited July 29, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/negtext.htm>.
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I am generally in agreement with Mr. Debevoise's principal proposals for
change. The WTO must accelerate the remaining evolution to a fully transparent
dispute resolution process. Voters, at least in North America, expect full and
frank consultation. Trade and investment issues are now as much discussed at
the kitchen table as in boardrooms. Trust in government is becoming a rare
commodity. Determining the fate of stakeholders on important issues behind
closed doors and denying them the right to their counsel of choice undermines
the credibility of and support for the system.
The WTO's scope is evolving. Traditional ways of doing business, government,
industry relationships, and the ability of governments to try to shape their economies are all under scrutiny. No area of regulation exists that is immune or exempt
from the thrust for harmonization and the quest for open global markets. The
target is a borderless commercial world where national origin of a good, service
provider, or investment capital is irrelevant. While this may still be a distant
goal, it is essential that trading countries continue to make progress towards that
goal. Market access negotiated for goods and services must not be impaired or
frustrated by the introduction or maintenance of regulatory systems or government
acceptance of restrictive business practices, which skew locational and investment
decisions.
I. Evolutionary Pressures
There are now pressures to deal with investments, anti-trust policy, restrictive
practices, and a range of other regulatory issues that have an impact on international trade, international competition and investment. Technological advances
in the information and communication industries are making traditional regulation
obsolete. They are a driving force for change and for more open markets. 2
Globalization and technology are forcing decision-makers to harmonize rules
and eventually eliminate regulatory differences. The United States is carefully
monitoring and cataloging the impact of these decisions on international business. 3
The scope for disputes is expanding. Greater public awareness of trade, the
environment, and human rights issues is creating a fertile ground for trade disputes.
II. Kitchen Tables vs. Board Room Tables
Imports have also become a popular target for many groups, and national and
sub-national governments. 4 Restricting trade is the means of attacking behavior
that is different. This behavior may not necessarily be bad, just different.
2. Peter Clark, Presentation before the Ontario Corn Producers' Association, London, Ontario
(Mar. 3, 1998).
3. Peter Clark, Addressing Private Restraints of Trade, Coalition for Open Trade (Sept. 1997).
4. Michael S. Lelyveld, EU rejects Massachusetts plan on Myanmar; may go to WTO, J. OF
COMM., Mar. 20, 1998.
FALL 1998
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If a country does not follow certain environmental standards, the answer is
to restrict their exports. Environmentalists are among the most anxious to use
trade measures to impose their views and standards on others.
We have seen restrictions on imports of tuna to protect dolphins.' Now exports
of shrimp are at risk unless sea turtles are adequately protected. 6 Protection of
these species is not wrong. But extra-territorial application of domestic law cannot
be accepted.
Representatives of NGOs and academics are very vocal in their claim that
globalization and technology have ignored the interests of workers. In a more
open trading environment, can great disparities in workers' rights be tolerated?
There is pressure for universal labor standards and to address social dumping.
If goals can not be achieved multilaterally, concerns will be pursued regionally
or through aggressive unilateralism. These forces will shape the agenda.
III. Deflating the Myths
The technical argument that disputes must be resolved in camera because they
involve governmental measures is not made of whole cloth. It never was. Private
sector players have interests in the regulatory systems and rules that shape trading
relationships and commercial interests. These industries and organizations will
have to accept and adapt to changes arising out of WTO decisions. While their
interests may be severely affected, the governments are acting on their behalf
as their counsel. A credible, viable WTO dispute settlement system requires
meaningful counsel-client relationships. It is not enough to provide pro-forma
briefings and de-briefings and then send the clients back to their hotels to await
the results. There must be full cooperation between government counsel in defending and promoting the interests and practices of national governments and
private counsels to stakeholders who would be affected by the change.
Canada's consultative process in trade disputes ensures an open two-way flow
of discussion and input, at every stage, under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) as well as the WTO. Outside the panel chamber, this
excellent counsel-client relationship could be seen as a model. However, Canada
continues to oppose the participation of private party counsel before panels and
denies stakeholder access to the panel room. Suggestions by participants that the
process is boring and uninteresting are not persuasive. Denial of access breeds
suspicion and distrust, and it does not enhance support for the proceedings nor
for the WTO.
Mr. Debevoise separates the issues of private counsel representation for private
party interests from that of Member countries' ability to seek outside counsel.
5. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993)
(panel report not adopted by the contracting parties).
6. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R,
(May 15, 1998) (visited July 29, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/online/ddf.htm>.
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While these two issues stem from different sources, the first emphasizing transparency issues and the second a question of process, they both relate to the subject
of increased accessibility and credibility for the WTO. The right of parties to
adequately choose outside counsel is one of due process. Clearly, smaller countries without a great depth of expertise or resources must be able to plead or
defend their interests on an equal footing. David Palmeter argues that excluding
private lawyers as counsel to Member countries has the practical effect to "deprive
smaller countries and developing countries of legal representation in panel decisions. "7 This problem seems to have been resolved quietly but the gamesmanship
that caused it may emerge in other areas.
Government officials find it very difficult, with their diverse and usually excessive workloads, to become as familiar with the evidence and the issues. This
heavy workload infringes on their ability to effectively act as counsel to the party
who has been involved in the case from the petition stage through participation
before investigating and administering authorities and subsequently through judicial review. Private counsel may be in a better position to understand the private
parties' interests and history, and to conduct fact-finding efforts, material analysis
and present a coherent case on behalf of his clients. These private interests,
through counsel, clearly have an important role to play not only in presenting
information to government and assisting government counsel, but also as a direct
party to proceedings.
As counsel to the Canadian beer' and dairy9 industries, both highly regulated
in Canada and no strangers to dispute settlement, I have observed the evolution
of a transparent consultation process in a very encouraging way. However, this
has not always been the case, particularly in panel proceedings involving the
application of trade remedy laws.
In Grain Corn,' ° the first CVD case against the United States, where the
affirmative injury finding of the Canadian Import Tribunal (CIT) was upheld in
appeals to both the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada,
a GATT panel rejected the tribunal's finding because there were allegedly no
imports. This perception arose out of imprecise drafting of the tribunal reasons
on this point.' This imprecision was noted in decisions at the Federal Court of
7. David Palmeter, The Need for Due Process in WTO Proceedings, J. OF WORLD TRADE 1,
Feb. 1997, at 53.
8. Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies,
Feb. 18, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 27 (1993); Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1993).
9. Tariffs Applied by Canadato Certain U.S. OriginAgriculturalProducts, NAFTA Secretariat
File No. CDA-95-2008-01, (Dec. 2, 1996).
10. Panel on Canadian Countervailing Duties on Grain Corn from the United States, May 36,
1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 411, 435-36,
5.2.9 & 5.2.10 (1993).
1I. The issue was whether or not it was necessary for there to be imports if subsidies reduced
prices in the "importing" country. This was an argument advanced in the context of the injury
criterion of increased burdens on domestic agricultural support programs. (This can occur when
prices fall in the non-subsidizing country.)
FALL 1998
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Appeal 2 and the Supreme Court of Canada. 3 The GATT panel focused on the
CIT's reasons and did not review the decisions at the level of domestic review.
Neither the industry nor counsel were consulted in a meaningful way. This rather
simple but devastating error could have been corrected.
In Beer III (dumpingfrom the USA),' 4 the panel relied (erroneously) on information that was not in the record to dismiss a regional industry determination by
the tribunal. While not criticizing the tribunal's assessment of the criteria related
to establishment of regional injury, the panel claimed that the tribunal should
have considered the liberalization of intra-provincial trade in beer.
Here too, going beyond the published reasons into the record would have
permitted the panel to review the evidence of provincial Liquor Board authorities
who did address this issue before the tribunal. Consultations and transparency
could well have led to a different result.
The interests of the domestic party or stakeholders are not diminished once
a matter moves from a domestic forum to an international one. Indeed, the
forces of economic globalization have ensured that the international forum is
of great consequence to all stakeholders from the smallest of domestic interests
to the largest multinational enterprises. Few of our industries and organizations
remain purely domestic in focus. The growth of institutions like the WTO has
meant that most of us not only have an interest, but a stake in such proceedings.
Because they cannot at least have their own counsel present to advise and
assist the government spokesperson, they are denied, internationally, their
right to be represented by counsel of their choice. This right cannot be denied
domestically.
Those opposed to the inclusion of outside counsel for Member countries point
to the aggressive style of today's lawyers, their potential economic inaccessibility
and misconduct. This opposition flows from a negative view of legal practice.
Indeed, this governmental view of private lawyers is not dissimilar to the negative
views the public holds of politicians and bureaucrats. Clearly, as Mr. Debevoise
suggests, many of these issues could be addressed by the WTO establishing
standards of conduct and practice.
It is not an overstatement to suggest that improved transparency in dispute settlement is one of the most urgent challenges for the WTO. The WTO
impacts so many diverse interests in a direct and significant way that it can
no longer be closed to so many. Mechanisms must be found to involve these
stakeholders in a meaningful way without impairing the institutional integrity
of the WTO.

12. National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Canada Import Tribunal), [1989] 2 F.C. 517
(F.C.A.).
13. National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Canada Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324.
14. Certain Malt Beverages from the U.S.A., CDA-95-1904-01 (Nov. 15, 1995).
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PETER MORRISON: Transparency in the WTO dispute settlement procedures
is a complex subject, but one which Whitney Debevoise has tackled thoroughly
in his presentation. In these comments, I propose to examine the transparency
issues that arise in WTO dispute procedures, some specific areas for improvement, and finally, some closing caveats that should be kept in mind as changes
to the system are proposed.

I. The Issues
Initially, transparency in the WTO was mainly concerned with the right to be
informed. Thus NGOs long complained that they could not examine written
submissions to panels and could not see panel reports until adoption. Transparency, however, is also about the right to inform and otherwise participate in the
adjudicative process. NGOs now want to make written submissions to panels
and to attend their meetings. Clearly, both the right to inform and to be informed
(and thus to participate in the adjudicative process) are both important aspects
of transparency.
Can there be too much transparency? How much is too much? These questions
trouble many domestic legal systems in which individual and community interests
must be balanced from a theoretical and practical point of view. Transparency
is ensured in these systems in the following ways:
" Only "parties" with a proven interest in the dispute have full rights of
participation in the dispute. They have the right to be heard and to participate in the adjudication (audi alterem parte). Giving non-parties such
rights could be impractical (there are too many such parties). More fundamentally, these rights could invite abuse-persons could, for example,
be heard who had no direct interest in the issue other than a desire that
a particular party lose.
" Legal systems usually also give rights to "non-parties" with no direct interest
in a dispute (the general public). Such persons generally have the right to
inform themselves of court proceedings, either directly (for a small number)
during the hearing or, more generally, through court records. Justice must
also be seen to be done.
Further complexity is added to the transparency issue because subjects of
WTO law are states, not individuals. Should an individual and or group having a
particular interest in an issue underlying a WTO dispute benefit from transparency
directly, or only through its government?
There are no easy answers to these questions. Domestic legal systems provide
some basic guidance. However, in the end, a complex balance has to be struck
between individual, group, and government interests. In establishing this balance,
account must be taken of the practicalities of adjudication, the types of interest
involved, and the basic claim of governments that through a nationality principle
they in fact represent the individual and group interests at stake.
FALL 1998
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II. Areas for Improvement
Debevoise comprehensively catalogues the main instances in WTO dispute
settlement where transparency issues arise, and makes several proposals. I will
discuss these briefly.
A.

GREATER PARTICIPATION OF THIRD PARTIES

Debevoise makes the valid point that before NGOs and others have access as
third parties to WTO dispute settlement procedures, the other WTO Members
should have such rights. WTO Members who are third parties in a dispute cannot,
under the current procedures, remain in the room during the whole panel proceedings and are limited to a brief written or oral intervention. On the other hand
nothing prevents them, should they have a real interest in the case, from becoming
a party by requesting consultations in their own right. Perhaps the DSU should
be amended to allow for the presence of third-party Members for the duration
of the panel and Appellate Body hearings.
Representation of NGOs still presents a problem. Who do they represent and
how? These are difficult issues. In the meantime, nothing prevents governments
from including NGO positions in their submissions, nor panels from requesting
information from competent international organizations.
B.

GREATER AVAILABILITY OF SUBMISSIONS

Debevoise argues persuasively for greater access to submissions. This "right
to be informed" issue has much to be said in its favor. The greater transparency
given to submissions that are freely circulated (subject to redaction of truly confidential parts) would ensure greater legal certainty. This increased access would
have the salutary effect of discouraging Members from taking diametrically opposed legal positions in successive cases merely to suit the side they happened
to be on.
C.

GREATER TRANSPARENCY DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

At the start of the implementation phase control passes from the panel, Appellate
Body, or DSB to the implementing Member. Transparency can be useful in
its potential to embarrass through publicity any Member that is tempted not to
implement or to implement late. Requiring every Member's domestic legislation
to permit legal action in cases of non-compliance by that Member of a WTO
ruling would also be useful. These changes could effectively supplement the
retaliation provisions in the DSU. On the other hand, Debevoise's proposal that
the WTO Secretariat be involved in the writing of summaries of proceedings
could be difficult because the Secretariat is required to be (and appear to be)
strictly neutral in all matters.
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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GREATER RIGHT TO USE PRIVATE COUNSEL

The issue of legal representation by private counsel in WTO dispute settlement
procedures is of the greatest interest to legal practitioners. This issue is also one
of the WTO's most misunderstood aspects. At the outset, the following points

should be made:
* A WTO Member (and a GATT Contracting Party previously) has always
been free to seek private legal counsel in a dispute settlement case. What
was unclear was the extent to which private legal counsel could appear
before a panel or the Appellate Body.
* Although changes will no doubt occur in the future, panel proceedings up
to now consist largely of recitations of written material prepared in advance.
Typically, no brilliant oral exchanges between top legal minds on the finer
points of WTO law take place. All but the most basic questions from panels
are usually answered in writing after checking government authorities in
capitals. The possibility of having specialized legal counsel in the panel
room has not, up to now, been seen as a great advantage.
" The Banana panel refused to allow one of the parties to be represented during
the hearings largely because (as the paper notes) of an agreement between
the parties to the dispute that no private lawyers would be present at the
hearing. Suddenly permitting this would have put at a disadvantage those
parties who had respected the agreement by not bringing private lawyers. The
panel was well aware of the general principle of the right to be represented by
counsel of one's choice.
In the end, the Appellate Body in the Bananas case accepted the presence of
private lawyers during panel and Appellate Body hearings. Nonetheless, troublesome issues arise with respect to this decision. For example:
* Who actually pays for such representation? Is legal aid necessary for developing countries? Would it be acceptable for underlying producer interest
groups to pay?
* Would lawyers be allowed to directly address the panels and the Appellate
Body? If so would they adopt an aggressive, adversarial style that could
lead to excessive formalism and lengthen the proceedings?
In my view, the time has come to allow the presence of private lawyers during
panel and Appellate Body procedures. These bodies, however, will have to be
prepared to resist any tendency of private counsel to delay proceedings by raising
unnecessary objections and procedural points.
III. Closing Caveats
Debevoise identifies several areas where transparency must be improved. But
how should this be done? Whatever modifications are sought, some important
points about WTO dispute settlement must be kept in mind.
FALL 1998
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LEAVE A ROLE FOR PRACTICE TO DEVELOP

The WTO legal system is still relatively immature. Although the system is
innovative in several areas (notably, eliminating the ability to block procedures
and creating the Appellate Body), it was built using the tried-and-true elements
of the GATT system, developed largely through trial and error. Excessive formalism is a danger. Procedures could lengthen, and new rules could easily lead to
unintended consequences.
The system is, despite the rules, ultimately based on the consent of its Members
and in their good faith application of the rules. Greater transparency is often
desirable, but a too wide and hasty ambition can lead to negative results. The
WTO legal system is not as robust as a typical domestic one.
B.

KEEP A BALANCE BETWEEN COMMUNITY INTEREST AND
"PARTY-CONTROL"

Parties will not use the system (or settle disputes easily) unless they feel that
they have a certain control over "their" dispute. A balance must therefore be
struck between the legitimate interests of third parties and others and the ability
of the main disputants to shape the course of the dispute.
C. BE

AWARE OF RESOURCE AND TIMING ISSUES

Greater transparency most often leads to greater demands on resources,
whether in the Secretariat or in WTO Members. Documents must be prepared,
translated, and circulated, and legal assistance must be dispensed. In an era of
zero nominal growth in budgets, the resource issues must be addressed concurrently with the transparency ones.
Timing issues must also be addressed. If the increasing participation of private
legal counsel leads to greater formalism and aggressive advocacy, Members will
have to be aware that the process could be slowed significantly.
D.

BE SENSITIVE TO DIFFERENT LEGAL TRADITIONS

A contrast is often made between U.S. and continental, or common law and
civil, legal traditions. The debate in the WTO on the Code of Conduct for panelists
showed that such differences can lead to different views on the appropriate treatment of issues such as transparency. This divide should be kept in mind when
assessing the chances of success of particular proposals to increase transparency.
E.

BE AWARE OF GOVERNMENT PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVATE LAWYERS

Although lawyers take pride in their profession and its association with the
ideals of justice, others do not always take that view. Trade policy experts in
government often see lawyers as just one more rent-seeking producer group. The
VOL. 32, NO. 3

KEY PROCEDURAL ISSUES: TRANSPARENCY

861

claim by private lawyers to participate actively in WTO disputes will therefore
be examined closely by governments. Lawyers seeking to extend the rules on
participation would do well to understand that perception.
IV. Conclusion
Debevoise convincingly shows that greater transparency is desirable in at least
certain WTO dispute settlement procedures. I endorse that view, but would add
a note of caution. Reform that is too ambitious, either in scope or timing, could
overload the system or even, in some cases, hinder further progress to a more
rule-based dispute settlement system.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SUMMARY: Heather Forton stated that Canada has
consulted extensively on all disputes and consistently makes public versions of all
written submissions available following hearing. The public versions of Canada's
submissions consist of the original versions with confidential information redacted
out.
Whitney Debevoise stated that on the issue of selecting counsel, he favors
allowing a country to be represented by counsel of its choosing, including private
counsel. What he objects to is allowing underlying private interests to have counsel
present in the panel room, a point on which he disagrees with Peter Clark. The
WTO is an organization of state members, and only state members should be
allowed into the panel room, although they may organize their delegations as
they see fit.
Robert Hudec addressed the issue of informality of dispute settlement versus
adherence to formal procedures. He commented that if lawyers representing
private interests are allowed into the panel room, it will change the character of
the proceedings and make it difficult for parties with limited resources to present
their cases. Hudec's concern is the advent of a "scorched earth" litigation approach. Hudec then asked what members of the private bar think the effect of
their presence in the panel room will have on the informality of the dispute
settlement process, and whether the presence of private attorneys will pollute
the process, as some have alleged.
Debevoise responded that it is up to each country to keep its delegation under
control. He said that contrary to Hudec's description of the panel process as
"informal," his experience has been that the process is "riddled with formality."
For instance, oral statements are not really oral; they must be presented in writing.
In responding to questions, parties frequently state that they must confer with
officials in their respective capitals first. Debevoise stated that there is not a lot
of room for an aggressive, scorched earth approach to panel proceedings.
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